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COMMENTARY
THE ART OF REPERCEIVING SCENARIOS AND THE FUTURE
P. H. Liotta and Timothy E. Somes
“Scenarios give . . . [decision makers] something very precious: the abil-
ity to reperceive reality.”
—PIERRE WACK
In the days when pharaohs ruled Egypt, a temple stood far up the Nile, beyond the
cataracts in Nubia, in what is now the northern desert of the Sudan. Three tributar-
ies joined together in that region to form the Nile, which flowed down one thousand
miles to produce a miraculous event each year, the flooding of its river basin, which
permitted Egyptian farmers to grow crops in the hot, rainless midsummer.
Every spring, the temple priests gathered at the river’s edge to check the color of
the water. If it was clear, the White Nile, which flowed from Lake Victoria through
the Sudanese swamps, would dominate the flow. The flooding would be mild, and
late; farmers would produce a minimum of crops. If the stream appeared dark, the
stronger waters of the Blue Nile, which joined the White Nile at Khartoum, would
prevail. The flood would rise enough to saturate the fields and provide a bountiful
harvest. Finally, if the stream showed dominance by the green-brown waters of the
Atbara, which rushed down from the Ethiopian highlands, then the floods would be
early and catastrophically high. The crops might drown; indeed, Pharaoh might
have to use his grain stores as a reserve.
Each year, the priests sent messengers to inform the king of the color of the water.
They may also have used lights and smoke signals to carry word downstream. Pha-
raoh then knew how prosperous the farmers in his kingdom would be, and how
much he could raise in taxes. Thus, he knew whether he could afford to conquer
more territory. As Pierre Wack . . . would say, the priests of the Sudanese Nile were
the world’s first long-term forecasters. They understood the meaning of predeter-
mined elements and critical uncertainties.1
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What possible connection could this vignette have with the practice of strategic
and future force planning? The answer might be more surprising than you think.
Since our focus in this essay centers on planning for the future and strategic
uncertainties, while not losing sight of the challenges and opportunities that
face us today, we have paid attention most to what the nation needs to both de-
fend and protect its interests in a time of discontinuous change. Yet just like the
priests of ancient Egypt, we also argue that strategies and policy makers need to
understand and recognize the constants, trends, and shifts that will shape and
determine the future security environment. In many ways then, one’s best
“guesstimate”must be informed by an ability to read the “river of change,” just as
the ancient priests were able to “read” the Nile. Thus, to provide reasonable anal-
ysis and information to decision and policy makers, we believe that almost al-
ways we have to let the facts get in the way of our opinion. Therefore, our own
assumptions, prejudgments, and even what we thought was a clear under-
standing of the world must be questioned. It may be a cliché, but it is also an
evident truth that how we view the world subtly but definitely affects how we
act in it. After all, the root from the ancient Greek for “geography” betrays the
idea of a “mental map,” an illustration of the world as we choose to see it. All of
us, whether we admit it or not, come equipped with a “mental map.” However,
if we are to be worth anything at all in making analyses and decisions in an in-
creasingly complex security environment, we must be willing to change that
mental map over time.
This essay thus attempts to integrate some of the ideas of Peter Schwartz,
whose book The Art of the Long View was used at the Naval War College for many
years, along with the ideas of Schwartz’s mentor, Pierre Wack, and others, with
elements and issues of special interest to the student of national security affairs
and future force planning.2
GETTING THE DECISION MAKER TO REPERCEIVE
The challenge for strategic planners is to help decision makers understand what
the future security environment might look like, to affect their perceptions, in
essence, to help them “reperceive.” Wack, who gained some fame as a strategic
planner during the oil crises of the 1970s with his ability to get the senior execu-
tives in Shell Oil to understand what might happen in the energy business, wrote
in the Harvard Business Review some years later:
Scenarios deal with two worlds: the world of facts and the world of perceptions. They
explore the facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of decision makers.
Their purpose is to gather and transform information of strategic significance into
fresh perceptions. This transformation process is not trivial—more often than not it
does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt
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“Aha!” from you  . . . [decision makers] and leads to strategic insights beyond the
mind’s previous reach.3
In short, to think and act effectively in an uncertain world, people need to
learn to reperceive—to question their assumptions and their understanding
about the way the world works. By questioning those assumptions and rethink-
ing the correct way to operate under uncertainty, we often see the world more
clearly than we otherwise would. Wack summarized his goals as a strategic plan-
ner and developer of scenarios by stating:
I have found that getting to that [decision makers’] “Aha!” is the real challenge of
scenario analysis. It does not simply leap at you when you’ve been presented all the
possible alternatives . . . . It happens when your message reaches the microcosms of
decision makers, obliges them to question their assumptions about how their . . . world
works, and leads them to change and reorganize their inner models of reality.4
Secretary of State Colin Powell, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
during the first Bush and the Clinton administrations, often valued such analy-
ses as setting the context for a “strategic conversation” so that real, and often dif-
ficult, decisions could be made about the future.
WHAT SCENARIOS ARE AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT
Scenarios help decision makers select alternative courses of action. Literally, sce-
narios create a “story line”so that analysts and decision makers can understand a
narrative “flow,” from which they can examine and question the constants,
trends, and shifts that are taking place in the security environment. It seems use-
ful to recall that the roots of both words “history” and “story” spring from the
same Greek word historia. Just as the traditional “story” of history helps to ex-
amine and better understand the past, scenarios can help us to examine and
question our choices for the future.
THE PROCESS OF CREATING SCENARIOS: DRIVING FORCES,
PREDETERMINED ELEMENTS AND CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES
As Schwartz puts it, scenarios are a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about al-
ternative environments where future decisions must be played out.5 On the sur-
face, scenarios may look like a set of stories, but they are built on carefully
constructed “plots” that make significant elements stand out by how they differ
within each specific story line. Creating and examining scenarios is a disciplined
way of thinking about the world.
While we emphasize that examining scenarios is a disciplined way of think-
ing, it is not a formal methodology, nor are they predictions, but they can help us
understand the future. It is folly to try to predict the exact outcome of the future.
L I O T T A & S O M E S 1 2 3
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The old Arab proverb “He who predicts the future lies even if he tells the truth” is
accurate. However, scenarios provide alternative projections and possibilities for
the future. Creating and understanding scenarios is an art form that can help us
to better recognize plausible outcomes and how to act on and better plan for
them in advance.
For example, in the 1980s, few in the business of assessing the long-term
global security environment forecasted the demise of the Soviet Union. (Those
who did were ridiculed within their organizations.) Instead, most assessments
and research saw the Cold War trends of the previous four decades as continuing
indefinitely. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and later with the
Soviet Union’s collapse, the U.S. defense establishment found itself in a signifi-
cant force drawdown and witnessed the cancellation of countless billions of dol-
lars of planned purchases. Though many strategic assessments at the beginning
of the twenty-first century focused on American vulnerabilities and the poten-
tial danger of “asymmetric” warfare, these assessments seriously underesti-
mated the damage that dedicated terrorists could inflict on the United States
(“9/11”), and the world.
Finally, the scenarios we are talking about are not the limited threat-based
planning scenarios common in defense planning. Threat-based scenarios, gen-
erally based on assessments of current or postulated threats or enemy capabili-
ties, determine only the amount and types of force needed to defeat an
adversary. (Similarly, capabilities-based planning seeks to avoid the perceived
limits of threat-derived scenarios.)6 In contrast, the scenarios we want to con-
sider should look well beyond current evaluations of threats. If future military
force capabilities are derived from the kind of scenarios we are discussing, they
must encompass the full range of possibilities, with a commensurate weighing
of benefits, costs, and risks. Accomplishing this is a difficult but essential chal-
lenge, if decision makers are to come to any informed, perceptive conclusions
for the future.
In Wack’s words, “Scenarios serve two purposes. The first is protective—
anticipating and understanding risk. The second is entrepreneurial—discover-
ing strategic options of which one was previously unaware.”7 Often, and proba-
bly naturally, decision makers prefer the illusion of certainty to understanding
risk and realities. But the scenario “builder” and analyst should strive to shatter
the decision maker’s confidence in his or her ability to look ahead with certainty
at the future. Scenarios should allow a decision maker to say, “I am prepared for
whatever happens,” because we have thought through complex choices with a
knowledgeable sense of risk and reward.8
Some scenario builders, including Pierre Wack, refuse to give definitions for
the discrete aspects, or elements, of the story line. Their argument to refuse to
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identify or separate specific aspects of the story suggests that it could be danger-
ous, even trivial, to reduce it to its bare bones. Instead of looking only at the skel-
eton, they argue that we should also examine the flesh and blood of the story line
in its entirety. As such, they emphasize the complex interdependence among ele-
ments of a story and de-emphasize focusing on specific definitions.
Others, however, especially Peter Schwartz, suggest that offering definitions
up front can be both helpful and necessary to aid our own perceptions, or
misperceptions, of reality. For Schwartz, the heart of “understanding” the pro-
cess is the identification and exploration of driving forces, predetermined ele-
ments, and critical uncertainties. Yet while literally thousands of former students
at the Naval War College have found these concepts useful, many have also mis-
understood them.
Driving Forces: What We KnowWe Care About
One such driving force was the rain. It fell upstream on the Nile’s tributaries, and
affected the balance between them. That, in turn, influenced the fate of thousands
of people whom the Pharaoh might conquer that year. There was a second driving
force, as well—the dependence on Nile flooding to grow crops. Had the Egyptians
had irrigation canals and fertilizer, they could have planted crops further out in the
desert. They would not have had to worry about the river flow at all.9
Wack suggests that scenario analysis demands first that decision makers un-
derstand the forces driving their organization, and their future choices. Power
and insight come from understanding the forces behind the outcome in any sce-
nario.10 Schwartz insists that if one fails to recognize the driving forces, there is
no way to begin thinking through a scenario.11 These elements of the scenario
hone one’s initial judgment and helps one to decide which factors are important.
Driving forces are the elements that move the plot of a scenario and directly
influence the story’s outcome.12 If we return to the vignette at the beginning of
this essay, we can better understand what the Egyptian priests were doing, by ex-
amining how they recognized the forces driving the movement of the Nile River.
In essence, the specific color of the water’s stream made it possible to guess the ef-
fect on the floods downstream. If each tributary that flowed into the Nile were the
same color, the priests would not have been able to project future outcomes with
as much certainty. So identifying and assessing driving forces is both a starting
point and an objective of the scenario method. Without an initial understanding
of driving forces, there is no way to begin thinking through a scenario.
In the same way, a senior defense leader needs to appreciate and attempt to
comprehend the huge complexities of the global security environment, the state
of the economy, technological advances in military systems, the movement of oil
and dependence on resources, and potential adversaries’ capabilities, to name
L I O T T A & S O M E S 1 2 5
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just a few. The key is to decide in each scenario which driving forces are
significant.
As a teaching methodology, we present various frameworks in seminars at the
Naval War College that are intended to help students look for driving forces for
future national security related scenarios.13 Also, according to Schwartz, and
others, there are several categories one should look for to discover driving forces
that can make a difference in the story line: society, technology, economics, poli-
tics, environment, and the military and defense infrastructures.14 Schwartz,
Wack, and many other long-range planners claim that it is helpful to work as a
team in developing meaningful scenarios. Individuals see things differently; a
member of a team will identify factors as key driving forces that will not be obvi-
ous to others. Often, this “leap or surprise”—the unexpected insight—can lead
to further insights and discoveries.
Predetermined Elements and Critical Uncertainties:
Understanding Their Differences
Put yourself now in the position of a priest on the river, watching the water turn
brown and green. To warn Pharaoh of a devastating flood required supreme confi-
dence. Being wrong was breaking a religious sacrament and would also, no doubt,
have meant losing one’s life. Priests had that confidence, however, because the fate
of the floods that year was predetermined. Nothing could change its impact on the
crops, even though the impact would not be felt for months later. The priests may or
may not have known why the color of the water affected the power of the flood. They
may or may not have been aware of the driving force—the rainfall pattern which
caused one river, or another, to dominate. But they knew the predetermined ele-
ments of flooding as well as they knew anything.15
Scenarios structure the future into both predetermined and uncertain ele-
ments. Any good scenario “reading” explores and seeks to comprehend these el-
ements. Often, events that are “already in the pipeline,” such as demographic
shifts or energy dependency, bring consequences that have yet to unfold, and
these consequences may have immense impact.
Schwartz provides one example to illustrate the shortcomings of conven-
tional forecasting and trend analysis:
[Consider] the U.S. birthrate. In the early 1970s it hovered around 3 million births
per year; forecasters at the U.S. Census Bureau projected that this “trend” would
continue forever. Schools, which had been rushed into construction during the baby
boom of the fifties and early sixties, were now closed down and sold. Policymakers
did not consider that the birthrate might rise again suddenly. But a scenario might
have considered the likelihood that original baby boom children, reaching their late
thirties, would suddenly have children of their own. In 1979, the U.S. birthrate began
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to rise . . . in 1990 [it was] almost back to the 4 million of the fifties. Demographers
also failed to anticipate that immigration would accelerate. To keep up with demand,
the state of California (which had been closing schools in the late 1970s) . . . [had to]
build a classroom every day for the next seven years.16
Assessing and developing the two fundamentals—predetermined elements
and critical uncertainties—when building a scenario may be among the more
valuable aspects of this process, or at least on what strategic planners spend
much of their time. Yet experience tells us that many of our war college students,
initially introduced to this art of scenario “reading,” find of particular value the
process of deciding what are predetermined elements, as opposed to critical un-
certainties. When we examine geostrategic regions, for example, we may strive
to recognize which elements of each region are predetermined, such as geogra-
phy, and which may be critical but uncertain identities, such as how the prede-
termined “importance” of geography can be made less important, or even
irrelevant, by the uncertainty and influence of technology.
It is characteristic of the U.S. military that it spends considerable time refin-
ing definitions of anything it feels is important. Yet the very nature of scenario
building suggests that there is no clear distinction between the building blocks
of driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties. These sep-
arate elements of the scenario are not set in concrete; they can shift and change
over time and space.
Let’s consider another example: the fact that this technology is having an im-
pact on the military is clear, yet many of the specific implications it will have on
the future of war remain unclear. Good, sound strategy should therefore adapt,
and seek to operate, at the nexus of the predetermined elements of accelerating
technology and the critical uncertainty of the pace of innovation. Thus, the
“predetermined” intersection between technological innovation and how, and
to what degree, it may contribute to the transformation of the American mili-
tary and its way of conducting war remain a critical uncertainty.
Predetermined Elements: What We KnowWe Know
In the arena of national security affairs, it remains imperative to identify key
predetermined elements. As recent events in the security environment empha-
size, the United States, partially because of its immense power and influence,
will remain politically engaged in many regions of the world. This recognition,
in turn, continues to lead to the involvement of various elements of the U.S. mil-
itary in many places in the world on a regular, and in some cases, continuous ba-
sis. Although there have been some who advocate a significant reduction to the
overseas commitment of U.S. forces, the events of 11 September 2001 again con-
firm that their presence there will likely continue. The U.S. military can accept as
L I O T T A & S O M E S 1 2 7
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a predetermined element that global engagement in some form, by the United
States, will continue in the foreseeable future, placing on it demands that will be
commensurate (if not greater) with those of the 1990s.
Certainly, in developing any realistic scenario of value, other predetermined
elements would include the realities of demographics, key geographic parame-
ters including distances in certain theaters of operations, climatic challenges,
and such other “nontraditional” aspects as the identity and form of governance
within societies and the rising significance of environmental, human, and even
“social” security. Schwartz offers some ways to look at these various aspects:
• Slow-changing phenomena. These include population growth, building a
physical infrastructure, and resource development.
• Constrained situations. For example, Japan must maintain a positive trade
balance because its aging population, spread out on four main islands, does
not possess the resources to feed, clothe, warm, or transport itself.
• In the pipeline. Today we know almost exactly how large the teenage
population in the United States will be in the near future. They are “in the
pipeline” already. The only uncertainty is immigration and how it will affect
these overall figures.
• Inevitable collisions. During the 1980s deficit, the American public
refused to provide the government with higher taxes just as they also
refused to give up any public benefits. Once the federal “gridlock” began,
there was no way out.17 (Again in 2000, when the United States thought it
had eliminated the federal deficit, it resurfaced just two years later. Thus
the competition for limited budget resources, and the inevitable conflicts
and collisions that will occur, may well be intractable, predetermined
elements of a national security scenario.)
There is also the possibility that the United States fears predetermined ele-
ments because it prefers to deny them. Schwartz illustrates this point by examin-
ing the reality of traffic gridlock that took place in large cities in the United
States in the mid-1990s. He calculated that if the number of people of driving
age were multiplied by the average number of cars per person in the United
States, the increased road mileage generated, planned highway construction,
and the length of time it takes to build highways (several years, at least), the con-
clusion would be that gridlock could not be avoided and is thus a predetermined
element. Subsequent events proved him correct.
Similar examples are widely available in the area of defense planning. The
continued lack of adequate Navy ships to meet national commitments might be
one case in point. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that American
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national leadership, with its continued emphasis on global engagement, will at-
tempt to maintain a level of naval presence in the oceans roughly on par with
that of the past decade. However, because of an insufficient number of ships, the
U.S. Navy is unable to meet this requirement. The war on terrorism has exacer-
bated the demand for more ships. Since ships take years to design, fund, and
build, a predetermined element in many maritime oriented scenarios is the lack
of adequate ships for many years.
Similar practical realities exist whenever military systems will take years to
build and field, whether the area of concern be space systems, missile defense
systems, major aircraft programs, or other comparable projects.
Critical Uncertainties: What We Thought We Knew but Didn’t—
or, the Demons Who Come in the Night
For five-thousand years, the waters of the Nile rose and fell predictably. The dy-
nasty of the pharaohs declined; other governments emerged and they too declined,
but the means for predicting floods remained basically the same. Then in the early
1960s, the Aswan High Dam was built. It was a remarkable feat of engineering,
five-hundred miles downstream from where the fierce Atbara joined the Nile.
Now if priests had still kept vigil at their temple (or government clerks a monitor-
ing station at the same locale upstream), they would have lost their ability to fore-
tell. Whether the water was blue, white, or green-brown, the result would be the
same: the flow would reach the Aswan Dam and stop. The fate of the flood plains
below is now in human hands.
One could perhaps, based on knowledge of Egyptian politics, make an educated
guess about the flooding level. It would now depend on two competing driving
forces: the farmers’ same need for water, and a new need by Egyptian consumers for
electricity from the dam. Regulating the dam was a political act, subject to pressure
from both sides. The flooding as a result became an “uncertainty.” If you wanted to
know how much money the Egyptian government could raise in taxes from farmers
this year, you could not simply tell from the color of the water. You had to find out
what the people in the dam’s control tower would do.18
Critical uncertainties come from predetermined elements. You often find
these uncertainties by questioning your assumptions about what you thought
was certain, or “predetermined.” Not meaning to sound too abstract, we like to
think of these critical uncertainties as being “things you thought you knew but
didn’t know at all.” Examples would include: the assumption that the United
States will continue as the sole economic, military, and political superpower in
the foreseeable future; that overseas presence will always determine future force
structure for the military; and that defense budgets will be available to fund ade-
quately the “transformation” of the military. In addition, while we argued earlier
L I O T T A & S O M E S 1 2 9
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that the events of 11 September again confirm that the presence of U.S. forces
overseas will likely continue, there are circumstances and conditions in which
this might not be true. Finally, while many believed and argued that the United
States was increasingly vulnerable and likely to suffer some form of asymmetric
attack prior to 11 September, no one sufficiently anticipated the horribly precise
orchestration and execution of those attacks.
Examples of critical uncertainty from history include some important reali-
ties that have had a deep and lasting impact, such as: until 1989 it seemed that
the Cold War was going to continue as it had for almost five decades and that the
Soviet Union was not going to go away any time soon; during World War II, Ad-
miral Raymond Spruance, while at Midway, knew the Japanese fleet was headed
toward Hawaii and that his challenge was to find it and strike it before the Japa-
nese found him; equally, the German leadership knew the Allies planned to land
on the coast of Europe, but not when or where.
In every scenario, regardless if it focuses on history, culture, economics, poli-
tics, or military force, there are critical uncertainties that must be assessed and
reckoned with. Moreover, after recognizing the uncertainties, one should also
begin to consider options and strategies for dealing with them.
THE ART OF REPERCEIVING
The relationship between driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical
uncertainties is complex, but important to understand, as we learn to “read the
flow” of what is occurring in useful scenarios. As Schwartz points out, “I some-
times think of the relationship between predetermined elements and critical un-
certainties as a choreographed dance. You cannot experience the dance just by
knowing the sequence of steps. Each dancer will interpret them differently, and
add his or her unpredictable decisions.”19 In terms of national security and de-
fense, one cannot anticipate the nature of a war merely by looking at the military
orders of battle, even if you know your plans and those of the enemy. In the same
fashion, by developing scenarios oriented to a more distant future, the interrela-
tionship between that which is predetermined and that which is uncertain may
be equally open to interpretation and changing factors. Pierre Wack offers sev-
eral thoughts with respect to the use of scenarios as tools:
I have found that scenarios can effectively organize a variety of seemingly unrelated
economic, technological, competitive, political, and societal information and translate
it into a framework for judgment—in a way that no model could do. . . . Decision sce-
narios describe different worlds, not just different outcomes in the same world. . . . You
can test the value of scenarios by asking two questions: (1) What do they leave out? In
five to ten years . . . [decision makers] must not be able to say that the scenarios did not
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warn of important events that subsequently happened. (2) Do they lead to action? If
scenarios do not push managers to do something other than that indicated by past ex-
perience, they are nothing more than interesting speculations.20
We are experiencing a world of dynamic change where even the most
mind-numbing, dramatic events do not impress us for long. Yet any good strate-
gist and planner must be able to help the nation’s leaders see more clearly the dif-
ferent futures that may occur. To operate in an uncertain world, we need to
reperceive—to question our assumptions about how the world works, so that we
see the world more clearly. The purpose of this is to help us make better deci-
sions about the future.
Perhaps one way to think about this is to obvert George Santayana’s famous
saying about learning from history by changing our perception of things that are
yet to come, by suggesting that “those who do not learn from the future are des-
tined to make mistakes in it.” To be able to understand that future, we have to
have a “mental map” flexible enough to consider plausible alternatives and pos-
sibilities we might not otherwise consider.
In the end, we can be certain of one thing: the future is not likely to be boring.
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